Library

The Critique of Judgement

Immanuel Kant

J. H. Bernard (1892)

Immanuel Kant's Critique of Judgement (Kritik der Urteilskraft, 1790) is the third and culminating Critique, seeking to bridge the gulf between the realm of nature (the First Critique) and the realm of freedom (the Second). Its first part, the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, analyzes judgements of the beautiful and the sublime as resting on a subjective yet universal 'purposiveness without purpose'; its second part, the Critique of Teleological Judgement, examines how we must think of organized nature as if it were purposive. The work founded modern aesthetics and shaped Romanticism and German Idealism. The translation is J. H. Bernard's of 1892.

Start readingYour notebookShow in graph

Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Analytic of the Aesthetical Judgement
  3. Analytic of the Beautiful
    1. § 1. The judgement of taste is aesthetical
    2. § 2. The satisfaction which determines the judgement of taste is disinterested
    3. § 3. The satisfaction in the PLEASANT is bound up with interest
    4. § 4. The satisfaction in the GOOD is bound up with interest
    5. § 5. Comparison of the three specifically different kinds of satisfaction
    6. § 6. The beautiful is that which apart from concepts is represented as the object of a universal satisfaction
    7. § 7. Comparison of the Beautiful with the Pleasant and the Good by means of the above characteristic
    8. § 8. The universality of the satisfaction is represented in a judgement of Taste only as subjective
    9. § 9. Investigation of the question whether in the judgement of taste the feeling of pleasure precedes or follows the judging of the object
    10. § 10. Of purposiveness in general
    11. § 11. The judgement of taste has nothing at its basis but the form of the purposiveness of an object (or of its mode of representation)
    12. § 12. The judgement of taste rests on a priori grounds
    13. § 13. The pure judgement of taste is independent of charm and emotion
    14. § 14. Elucidation by means of examples
    15. § 15. The judgement of taste is quite independent of the concept of perfection
    16. § 16. The judgement of taste, by which an object is declared to be beautiful under the condition of a definite concept, is not pure
    17. § 17. Of the Ideal of beauty
    18. § 18. What the modality in a judgement of taste is
    19. § 19. The subjective necessity, which we ascribe to the judgement of taste, is conditioned
    20. § 20. The condition of necessity which a judgement of taste asserts is the Idea of a common sense
    21. § 21. Have we ground for presupposing a common sense?
    22. § 22. The necessity of the universal agreement that is thought in a judgement of taste is a subjective necessity, which is represented as objective under the presupposition of a common sense
  4. Analytic of the Sublime
    1. § 23. Transition from the faculty which judges of the Beautiful to that which judges of the Sublime
    2. § 24. Of the divisions of an investigation into the feeling of the sublime
    3. § 25. Explanation of the term “sublime”
    4. § 26. Of that estimation of the magnitude of natural things which is requisite for the Idea of the Sublime
    5. § 27. Of the quality of the satisfaction in our judgements upon the Sublime
    6. § 28. Of Nature regarded as Might
    7. § 29. Of the modality of the judgement upon the sublime in nature
    8. § 30. The Deduction of aesthetical judgements on the objects of nature must not be directed to what we call Sublime in nature, but only to the Beautiful
    9. § 31. Of the method of deduction of judgements of Taste
    10. § 32. First peculiarity of the judgement of Taste
    11. § 33. Second peculiarity of the judgement of Taste
    12. § 34. There is no objective principle of Taste possible
    13. § 35. The principle of Taste is the subjective principle of Judgement in general
    14. § 36. Of the problem of a Deduction of judgements of Taste
    15. § 37. What is properly asserted a priori of an object in a judgement of Taste
    16. § 38. Deduction of judgements of Taste
    17. § 39. Of the communicability of a Sensation
    18. § 40. Of Taste as a kind of sensus communis
    19. § 41. Of the empirical interest in the Beautiful
    20. § 42. Of the intellectual interest in the Beautiful
    21. § 43. Of Art in general
    22. § 44. Of beautiful Art
    23. § 45. Beautiful Art is an art, in so far as it seems like nature
    24. § 46. Beautiful Art is the art of genius
    25. § 47. Elucidation and confirmation of the above explanation of Genius
    26. § 48. Of the relation of Genius to Taste
    27. § 49. Of the faculties of the mind that constitute Genius
    28. § 50. Of the combination of Taste with Genius in the products of beautiful Art
    29. § 51. Of the division of the beautiful arts
    30. § 52. Of the combination of beautiful arts in one and the same product
    31. § 53. Comparison of the respective aesthetical worth of the beautiful arts
    32. § 54. Remark
  5. Dialectic of the Aesthetical Judgement
    1. § 55. Section 55
    2. § 56. Representation of the antinomy of Taste
    3. § 57. Solution of the antinomy of Taste
    4. § 58. Of the Idealism of the purposiveness of both Nature and Art as the unique principle of the aesthetical Judgement
    5. § 59. Of Beauty as the symbol of Morality
  6. Appendix
    1. § 60. Of the method of Taste
    2. § 61. Of the objective purposiveness of Nature
  7. Analytic of the Teleological Judgement
    1. § 62. Of the objective purposiveness which is merely formal as distinguished from that which is material
    2. § 63. Of the relative, as distinguished from the inner, purposiveness of nature
    3. § 64. Of the peculiar character of things as natural purposes
    4. § 65. Things regarded as natural purposes are organised beings
    5. § 66. Of the principle of judging of internal purposiveness in organised beings
    6. § 67. Of the principle of the teleological judging of nature in general as a system of purposes
    7. § 68. Of the principle of Teleology as internal principle of natural science
  8. Dialectic of the Teleological Judgement
    1. § 69. What is an antinomy of the Judgement?
    2. § 70. Representation of this antinomy
    3. § 71. Preliminary to the solution of the above antinomy
    4. § 72. Of the different systems which deal with the purposiveness of nature
    5. § 73. None of the above systems give what they pretend
    6. § 74. The reason that we cannot treat the concept of a Technic of nature dogmatically is the fact that a natural purpose is inexplicable
    7. § 75. The concept of an objective purposiveness of nature is a critical principle of Reason for the reflective Judgement
    8. § 76. Remark
    9. § 77. Of the peculiarity of the human Understanding, by means of which the concept of a natural purpose is possible
    10. § 78. Of the union of the principle of the universal mechanism of matter with the teleological principle in the Technic of nature
    11. § 79. Whether teleology must be treated as if it belonged to the doctrine of nature
    12. § 80. Of the necessary subordination of the mechanical to the teleological principle in the explanation of a thing as a natural purpose
    13. § 81. Of the association of mechanism with the teleological principle in the explanation of a natural purpose as a natural product
    14. § 82. Of the teleological system in the external relations of organised beings
    15. § 83. Of the ultimate purpose of nature as a teleological system
    16. § 84. Of the final purpose of the existence of a world, i.e. of creation itself
    17. § 85. Of Physico-theology
    18. § 86. Of Ethico-theology
    19. § 87. Of the moral proof of the Being of God
    20. § 88. Limitation of the validity of the moral proof
    21. § 89. Of the use of the moral argument
    22. § 90. Of the kind of belief in a teleological proof of the Being of God
    23. § 91. Of the kind of belief produced by a practical faith