This disposition of the Soul, which carries it always to different objects, makes it relish all the Pleasures which flow from Surprize; a sentiment which pleases the Soul by the object which it beholds, and by the suddeness of the action; for it perceives or feels something which it does not expect, or in a manner which it did not expect.
A thing may surprize us as wonderful, and, at the same time, as new, and also as unexpected; and, in these last cases, the principal sentiment is united to this accessory one, that the thing is new or unexpected.
It is by this that games of hazard interest us; they present us with a continued series of unexpected events: ’tis by this that social games please us; they too are a set of unforeseen events, brought about by address joined to chance.
It is by this also that we are pleased with theatrical pieces; they are unravelled by degrees, the events are concealed till they happen, new subjects of surprize are always prepared for us, and they often afford us a sensible pleasure, by shewing the events to be such as we ought to have foreseen they would be. In a word, works of genius, are commonly read for no other reason but because they procure an agreeable surprize, and make amends for the insipidity of conversations that have not this effect.
Surprize may be produced either by the object, or by the manner of producing it: for we see an object greater or less than it is in fact, or different from what it is; or we see the same object, but with an additional idea which surprises us. Such, in any thing, is the accessory idea of the difficulty of making it, or the person who made it, or the time when it was made, or the manner how it was made, or some other circumstance connected with it.
Suetonius describes the crimes of Nero with a coolness of blood which surprises us, by making us almost believe that he does not feel sufficient horror for what he describes; but he suddenly changes his style, and says, “The universe having suffered such a monster fourteen years, at last abandoned him:” Tale monstrum per quatuordecim annus perpessus terarum orbis tandem destituit. This produces in the mind different kinds of surprize: we are surprised at the author’s change of style; at the discovery of his different manner of thinking; at his method of relating in so few words one of the greatest revolutions that ever happened: thus the soul finds a vast number of different sensations that concur to move it, and to inspire it with Pleasure.
OF DIFFERENT CAUSES THAT PRODUCE SENSATION.
We ought carefully to observe, that one Sensation has commonly more than one cause in the mind. It is, if I dare venture to make use of the term, a certain dose produced by Force and Variety. Genius consists in knowing how to strike several organs at once; and if we examine different writers, we shall perhaps perceive, that the best of them, and those who have pleased most, are those who have excited in our Mind most Sensations at one time.
Pray observe the multiplicity of Causes. We like to view a garden finely laid out, better than a confusion of trees. 1. Because our prospect, which would be confined, is not so. 2. Every walk is one, and forms one grand object; whereas, amidst confusion, every tree is one object, and a little one. 3. We see an arrangement which we were not accustomed to see. 4. We are pleased with the pains which have been taken. 5. We admire the care they take perpetually to resist Nature, which by spontaneous productions would put every thing in confusion. This is so true, that a garden quite neglected is intolerable. Sometimes the difficulty of a work, sometimes the easiness of it, pleases us; and, as in a magnificent garden we admire the grandeur and expence of its owner, we observe sometimes with delight, that they have had the art to please us with small expence and labour.
Gaming pleases us, because it satisfies our avarice, that is, our hope of possessing more: it flatters our vanity by an idea of that preference which fortune gives us, and the notice which others take of our luck: it satisfies our curiosity by presenting a sort of show to us. In a word, it gives us all the different pleasures of surprize.
Dancing pleases us by its nimble activity; by a certain grace; by the beauty and variety of attitudes; by its harmony with the music; the person who dances being, as it were, an instrument which accompanies it: but, above all, it pleases us by a particular disposition of our brain, by which it is so constituted that it refers and associates the idea of all the motions to certain other motions, and the greatest part of the attitudes, to other attitudes.
OF SENSIBILITY.
Things almost always please and displease us in different respects. For example, Italian eunuchs ought to give us little pleasure. 1. Because it is not surprising that, trimmed as they are, they should sing well; they are like an instrument from which the workman has cut off wood, to make it produce sounds. 2. Because the passions which they act are too much suspected of being false. 3. Because they are neither of the sex we love, nor of that which we esteem. On the other hand, they may please us, because they preserve a long time the air of youth; and also because they have a voice extremely flexible, and which is peculiar to themselves. Thus every thing gives us a feeling which is composed of a great many others, which sometimes weaken and counteract each other.
The soul often forms reasons to itself of its pleasure: and it succeeds in this principally by those associations of ideas which it connects with certain objects. Thus, any thing which has pleased us, pleases us still for that very reason that it has pleased us, because we join the new to the old idea: thus, an actress who has pleased us on the stage, pleases us too in a private room; her voice, her action, the remembrance of having seen her admired, what do I say? — the idea of the princess joined to that of herself; all this makes a sort of composition, which forms and produces a pleasure. We are all full of accessory ideas: a lady who should happen to have a great character, and a trifling defect, might make this be regarded as a beauty, and bring it into fashion. The greatest part of those ladies whom we love, have nothing for them but the prepossession of their birth or their fortune, the honours or esteem of certain people.
OF DELICACY.
People of delicacy are those who, to every idea or to every taste, join a great many accessory Ideas and tastes. Indelicate people have only one idea; their mind can neither compound nor diminish; they neither add nor take away from what Nature has given: while people of delicacy when in love form to themselves the greatest part of the pleasures of love.
Polyxena and Apicius brought to table a great many sensations unknown to us vulgar eaters; and those who judge with taste of the works of wit have, and have formed to themselves an infinite number of sensations which other men have not.