Another opinion upon the Vital Principle has been handed down, which to many is not less acceptable than any one of those already alluded to, but which, having been scrutinized in our popular disquisitions, has been found to be wanting. The supporters of this opinion say, that the Vital Principle is some kind of harmony; that harmony is a mixture and compound of contraries, and that the body is constituted of contraries. But although harmony is a certain proportion or compound of particles mixed together, it is not possible that the Vital Principle should be the one or the other; for it forms no part of harmony to produce motion, but all writers agree in assigning motive power to the Vital Principle as its most characteristic property. The term harmony, besides, is applicable rather to health and the corporeal powers in general, than to the Vital Principle, as would be very manifest to any one who should undertake to account, by any harmony, for the emotions and functions of the Vital Principle; for it would be scarcely possible to reconcile them to one another. If harmony, besides, may be spoken of with reference to two points—as applicable, most especially, to the composition of particles in masses which have motion and proportion, whenever they may so coalesce as not to admit of any which are homogeneous, and then as applicable to the proportion of the commingled particles, yet in neither sense can it be reasonable to regard Vital Principle as harmony, nor can the Vital Principle be the composition of the parts of the body: for the composition of the parts (and many and various are the compositions of the parts) is quite open to examination—but of what can we suppose that the mind, or the sentient, or the appetitive faculty is a composition? or how is any one of them to be composed? It is equally absurd to think that the Vital Principle can be the proportion of the mixture, since the mixture of the elements which forms flesh is differently proportioned from that which forms bone. It will happen, too, from this theory, that there are many Vital Principles, and many in every body, if all bodies are from the elements in combination, and if the proportion of the combination is harmony and Vital Principle. We might inquire too of Empedocles, who maintains that each of those bodies exists in a certain proportion, whether Vital Principle is the proportion? or whether rather is it present in the members, as something different from proportion? Is affinity, besides, the cause of a fortuitous or a definite combination of parts? And then, again, is affinity the proportion, or something besides the proportion?
Such are the difficulties which present themselves; but if the Vital Principle is something different from the composition, what is that which is simultaneously destroyed with the life, in the flesh, and other parts of an animal? Besides these questions, since each of the parts of the body has not Vital Principle, unless the Vital Principle is the proportion of the composition in the parts, what is that which is destroyed when the Vital Principle has forsaken the body? It is then clear, from what has been adduced, that Vital Principle can neither be any kind of harmony, nor be moving in a circle.
But to maintain that the Vital Principle is moved by accident is to maintain, as we have said, that it moves itself as it is moved in that in which it is, and which is moved by it; and that it cannot possibly have locomotion in any other way. It might, however, with greater probability be doubted, and for the following considerations, whether it moves at all—for we are accustomed to say that the Vital Principle is daring or afraid, is angry too, and both feels and thinks, and as all these seem to be motions, it might be supposed that the Vital Principle does move. But yet this is no necessary consequence—for if to grieve, to rejoice or think are motions, in the fullest sense, then each of them is motion, and motion may be said to emanate from the Vital Principle, as anger or fear is produced by the heart being moved in this or that manner, and thinking may be some analogous or different kind of motion; but some of these phænomena are produced by the displacement of certain particles in motion, and others by change, the explanation of the quality and manner of which is foreign to the present inquiry.
Now to maintain that the Vital Principle is angry is very much like saying that it weaves or builds, and thus it would, perhaps, be better to say, not that Vital Principle pities, learns or thinks, but that the man, by his Vital Principle, is so affected or so engaged. It is not, however, hereby implied that motion is in the Vital Principle, but, on the contrary, that sometimes it proceeds to, and sometimes comes from it; as sentient impression is from external objects, and recollection comes from it to the movements or impressions abiding in the sentient organs. The mind seems to be a peculiar innate essence, and to be indestructible; were it destructible, however, it would, in an especial sense, be so by the dulness attendant upon age, when probably that happens to the mind which takes place in the sentient organs; for if an aged person could take an eye of a certain character, he would see as well as a young man. Thus, the infirmities of age are attributable, not to the Vital Principle having been in aught affected, but to its recipient suffering, as it does from drunkenness or maladies. Thus, too, thought and reflexion languish when any thing within the body has been destroyed, but that which thinks is impassive. The properties, therefore, of thought, love and hatred belong, not to it, but to that which contains it, and as it contains it; so that when this recipient is destroyed, it can either recollect nor love, as those emotions emanate not from it, but from that which was in common with it, and which has perished. But the mind is probably something more divine, and it is impassive.
It is, then, manifest from what has been adduced, that Vital Principle cannot be in motion; and if altogether without motion, it cannot clearly be self-moved.
The most unreasonable by far of all the opinions upon Vital Principle is that which holds it to be a number with self-motion, for it is beset with insuperable objections; those, in the first place, which result from the idea of motion, and then those more particular objections to speaking of it as a number. How, indeed, is it possible to think of an unit in motion? by what or how, being indivisible and homogeneous, is it to be moved? If said to be both motor and moved, it must have distinction of some kind. Since, besides, they say that a line in motion forms a surface, and a point in line, then units in motion will form lines, as the point is distinguished from the unit only by position; and thus the number of Vital Principle has already locality and position. If, again, from any number there be subtracted a number or an unit, there remains a different number; but plants and many creatures, after having been divided, live on, and appear still, in a specific sense, to possess the same Vital Principle. It might also be supposed to make no difference whether we speak of the Vital Principle as formed of units or corpuscles; for if points are substituted for the spherules of Democritus and quantity alone remains, there will still be in that quantity, as in all continuity, a motor and a moved; for the theory takes account neither of greatness or smallness, but only of quantity. Thus, there must of necessity be something to impart motion to the units. But if the Vital Principle is the motor in an animal, so must it be in the number, and thus the Vital Principle, being no longer motor and moved, is the motor only. Even admitting that the Vital Principle may, in some way, be an unit, there must still be some distinction between it and other units; but what distinction, save that of position, can there be between one unit and another? If then the units and points which are in the body are different, the units will be on the same spot as the points, for the unit will occupy the place of the point; but what then is there to prevent them from being infinite in number on the same spot, even if there be only two, as things are indivisible of which the locality is indivisible? But if the points in the body are the number of the Vital Principle, or if the number formed from the points in the body is the Vital Principle, why have not all bodies Vital Principle? Now there seem to be points in all bodies, and those infinite in number. How besides is it possible for the Vital Principles to be separated and set free from bodies, since lines are not divisible into points?