Whenever cogitation is employed upon what may be indivisible it is not subject to error, but when engaged upon topics which involve both error and truth, there is a simultaneous combination of thoughts, whereby they are, so to say, individualized; in the way that Empedocles expressed himself, "Now the heads of many creatures budded forth without necks, and then, heads and necks were by affinity made one." It is thus that thoughts, however disconnected, as the incommensurable and the diameter, are by the intelligence joined together. If the question relate to things past or future, the mind, thinking upon time besides, adds it to the other conditions; for error lies ever in the combination, as when the white is said not to be white, the error is in the addition of the negative. Now, it is always in our power to speak of things individually; but then, it is not only true or false that Clem is fair, but equally so that he ever was or ever will be fair. It is the mind which individualizes each subject. But since the indivisible is in the twofold state either of potentiality or actuality, there is nothing to preclude the mind when thinking upon extension, from thinking upon it as indivisible, for it is indivisible, actually, and in time which is indivisible; as time, like extension, is both divisible and indivisible. It may not then be said that the mind thinks upon any subject in each half; for extension exists only in potentiality, unless it have been divided. But the mind, when thinking upon each of the halves separately, divides the time simultaneously, and then time becomes such as the two extensions; and if the mind make a whole of the two halves, it does the same with time in its relation to them. The mind, however, thinks upon the indivisible as species and not as quantity, in an indivisible portion of time and by an indivisible part of Vital Principle; and this neither by accident, nor in so far as the subjects thought upon, or the part by which, or the time in which, it thinks, are divisible, but as they are indivisible. There is, in fact, in such cases a something indivisible, although it may not be separate, which makes time and extension to be one; and which holds good for all continuity, whether of time or extension. Now, the point and every analogous division, and whatever is as the point indivisible, are made known as being privation of something. The reasoning upon other subjects is like this, for were it asked how the mind is to recognise bad or black, it may be answered, that it recognises them in some way by their contraries; but that which recognises them must, in potentiality, be the thing recognised, and be present also in it. If to any one of the senses there is no contrary, then that sense recognises itself, is in activity and separate from all else. An affirmation, like a negation, is something in relation to something, and is always either true or false; but not so with the mind, as it is true when it judges of any thing after its essence, and may not be true when it judges of something in its relation to something else. Thus, the visual perception of any particular object is true, but whether a something white which is seen be or be not a man is not invariably true; and this holds good for abstractions.