Library · Nicomachean Ethics · Book VI

Chapter III

Aristotle

Commencing then from the point stated above we will now speak of these Excellences again. Let those faculties whereby the Soul attains truth in Affirmation or Negation, be assumed to be in number five:[1] viz. Art, Knowledge, Practical Wisdom, Science, Intuition: (Supposition and Opinion I do not include, because by these one may go wrong.)

What Knowledge is, is plain from the following of considerations, if one is to speak accurately, instead of being led away by resemblances. For we all conceive that what we strictly speaking know, cannot be otherwise than it is, because as to those things which can be otherwise than they are, we are uncertain whether they are or are not, the moment they cease to be within the sphere of our actual observation.

So then, whatever comes within the range of Knowledge is by necessity, and therefore eternal, (because all things are so which exist necessarily,) and all eternal things are without beginning, and indestructible.

Again, all Knowledge is thought to be capable of being taught, and what comes within its range capable of being learned. And all teaching is based upon previous knowledge; (a statement you will find in the Analytics also,)[2] for there are two ways of teaching, by Syllogism and by Induction. In fact. Induction is the source of universal propositions, and Syllogism reasons from these universals.[3] Syllogism then may reason from principles which cannot be themselves proved Syllogistically: and therefore must by Induction.

So Knowledge is “a state or mental faculty apt to demonstrate syllogistically,” &c. as in the Analytics:[4] because a man, strictly and properly speaking, knows, when he establishes his conclusion in a certain way, and the principles are known to him: for if they are not better known to him than the conclusion, such knowledge as he has will be merely accidental. Let thus much be accepted as a definition of Knowledge.

Notes

  1. The mind attains truth, either for the sake of truth itself ([Greek: aplos]), or for the sake of something further ([Greek: eneka tinos]). If the first then either syllogistically ([Greek: episteme]), non-syllogistically ([Greek: nous]), or by union of the two methods ([Greek: sophla]). If the second, either with a view to _act_ ([Greek: phronesis]), or with a view to _make_ ([Greek: techne]). Otherwise. The mind contemplates Matter Necessary or Contingent. If necessary, Principles ([Greek: nous]), Deductions ([Greek: episteme]), or Mixed ([Greek: sophla]). If Contingent, Action ([Greek: phronesis]), Production ([Greek: techen]). (Giphanius quoted in Cardwell’s notes.)
  2. It is the opening statement of the Post Analytics.
  3. Aristotle in his logical analysis of Induction, Prior. Analytics II. 25, defines it to be “the proving the inherence of the major term in the middle (_i.e._ proving the truth of the major premiss in fig. 1) through the minor term.” He presupposes a Syllogism in the first Figure with an universal affirmative conclusion, which reasons, of course, from an universal, which universal is to be taken as proved by Induction. His doctrine turns upon a canon which he there quotes. “If of one and the same term two others be predicated, one of which is coextensive with that one and the same, the other may be predicated of that which is thus coextensive.” The fact of this coextensiveness must be ascertained by [Greek: nous], in other words, by the Inductive Faculty. We will take Aldrich’s instance. All Magnets attract iron A B C are Magnets A B C attract iron. Presupposed Syllogism reasoning from an universal. A B C attract iron (Matter of observation and experiment) All Magnets are A B C (Assumed by [Greek: nous], i.e. the Inductive faculty) All Magnets attract iron (Major premiss of the last Syllogism proved by taking the minor term of that for the middle term of this.) Or, according to the canon quoted above: A B C are Magnets. A B C attract iron. But [Greek: nous] tells me that the term Magnets is coextensive with the term A B C, therefore of all Magnets I may predicate that they attract iron. Induction is said by Aristotle to be [Greek: hoia phanton], but he says in the same place that for this reason we must _conceive_ ([Greek: noehin]) the term containing the particular Instances (as A B C above) as composed of all the Individuals. If Induction implied actual examination of all particular instances it would cease to be Reasoning at all and sink into repeated acts of Simple Apprehension it is really the bridging over of a chasm, not the steps cut in the rock on either side to enable us to walk down into and again out of it. It is a branch of probable Reasoning, and its validity depends _entirely_ upon the quality of the particular mind which performs it. Rapid Induction has always been a distinguishing mark of Genius the certainty produced by it is Subjective and not Objective. It may be useful to exhibit it Syllogistically, but the Syllogism which exhibits it is either nugatory, or contains a premiss _literally_ false. It will be found useful to compare on the subject of Induction _as the term is used by Aristotle_, Analytica Prior. II 25 26 Analytica Post. I. 1, 3, and I. Topics VI I and X.
  4. The reference is made to the Post Analyt I II and it is impossible to understand the account of [Greek: epistaemae] without a perusal of the chapter, the additions to the definition referred to relate to the nature of the premisses from which [Greek: epistaemae] draws its conclusions they are to be “true, first principles incapable of any syllogistic proof, better known than the conclusion, prior to it, and causes of it.” (See the appendix to this Book.)